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1557 
The Dictionary as a Specialized Corpus 
Jennifer L. Mascott* 
Scholars consider reliance on dictionary definitions to be the 
antithesis of objective, big-data analysis of ordinary meaning. This 
Article contests that notion, arguing that when dictionaries are treated 
as a specialized database, or corpus, they provide invaluable textured 
understanding of a term. Words appear in dictionaries both as terms 
being defined and as terms defining other words. Examination of every 
reference to a contested term throughout a dictionary’s definitional 
entries of other words may substantially benefit statutory and 
constitutional interpretation. Because dictionaries catalog language, 
their use as a specialized corpus provides invaluable insight into the ways 
a particular word is used in relation to terms throughout the English 
language. Such evidence provides a crucial interpretive launchpad, even 
for corpus-based researchers looking for a collection of possible word 
meanings to analyze in a database of ordinary-language documents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have suggested that dictionary-based interpretive 
research may be the antithesis of broad-based, objective corpus 
linguistics analysis.1 And done in its most traditional, and limited, 
manner, it is. 
Corpus linguistics research involves researching the way a 
particular term is used in a big database2 containing “a balance of 
different genres of texts” to acquire a “representative slice” of the 
term’s “usage and meaning.”3 The idea is that by studying the context 
of how a word is used in natural language the interpreter can acquire 
a more unbiased picture of “ordinary meaning”4 than by consulting 
dictionaries—written for the express purpose of inviting “linguistic 
scrutiny.”5 Giving excessive weight to a single dictionary definition 
may generate a conclusion about word meaning that is substantially 
less-informed than interpretive analysis employing a broad-
based  corpus.6  
Despite these potential shortcomings of dictionary definitions 
used as isolated interpretive tools, this Article will explore how 
dictionaries used as a specialized corpus may supplement, and even 
benefit, traditional corpus linguistics research. Looking in just one 
 
 1. See, e.g., Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies 
and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1915–16, 1951–55 
(characterizing dictionaries as “inadequate objects of our devotion” and contrasting reliance on 
dictionary definitions with the use of more broad-based, empirical corpus linguistics techniques); 
James C. Phillips et al., Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New Tool to Make 
Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J.F. 21, 23–24 (2016) (contrasting the deficiencies of 
exclusive reliance on founding era dictionaries with the benefits of corpus linguistics analysis). 
 2. See Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 9) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2918952) 
(discussing Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as 
an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156, 161–62 (2011)). 
 3. Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 24. 
 4. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1953–54 (suggesting that one way to assess a statutory 
term’s “ordinary meaning” is to identify “the ‘common usage’ of a statutory term,” which may 
be located “quantifiably through a linguistic methodology called corpus linguistics”). 
 5. Id. at 1954–55. 
 6. See Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 23–24. 
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dictionary at the meanings specifically assigned to a given term may 
very well provide a distortedly narrow understanding of the word. But 
what if dictionaries contain previously unmined interpretive data? 
Treating a dictionary as a mini corpus to examine how a particular 
term is used in the context of defining the dictionary’s other terms can 
provide richness to the study of word meaning.7 Corpus linguistics 
interpretive methodology often involves searching in a database 
containing a wide variety of documents such as letters, newspapers, 
pamphlets, and speeches—representing the language usage of a large 
community.8 But a corpus may also be specialized, focusing just “on a 
particular linguistic community, such as a particular region, type of 
language user, or genre of language.”9 Dictionaries similarly could 
serve as one type of mini specialized corpus—searched as their own 
self-contained database containing definitions of words and utilizing 
those words in context to define other terms. Examination of each and 
every reference to a contested term throughout a dictionary’s 
definitional entries of other words may substantially benefit 
constitutional and statutory interpretation. It could bring greater 
texture to one’s understanding of a contested term to see how it is 
used to define other words throughout the breadth of the English 
language. This may help an interpreter uncover numerous permissible 
meanings of a term beyond those listed by the dictionary author in 
the definitional entries for the term itself. 
Such an approach may benefit constitutional interpretation in 
particular. Linguistics scholars have shown that a legal interpreter’s 
instinctive sense of the meaning of a term is not reliably consistent, 
even when the term arises in a contemporary statute using 
contemporary English.10 Certainly, in comparison, a twenty-first 
 
 7. See, e.g., Mascott, supra note 2, Section II.B.2 (utilizing Nathan Bailey’s 1783 
dictionary as a mini corpus as one resource to better understand the eighteenth-century meaning 
of the word “officer”). 
 8. See Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 25, 31. 
 9. Id. at 25 (observing, for example, that “a corpus created [just] of the debates on the 
federal Constitution would be a specialized corpus”). 
 10. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy A. Gales, Finding Ordinary Meaning in Law: 
The Judge, the Dictionary or the Corpus? 2016 INT’L J. LEGAL DISCOURSE 253, 
https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/ijld.2016.1.issue-2/ijld-2016-0016/ijld-2016-
0016.pdf (describing research that shows “speakers of English are frequently unaware of the 
contextual layers of meaning that accompany words—connotative meaning that is shared by 
speakers of a language but is not recorded in dictionaries”). 
8.MASCOTT_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  4:09 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
1560 
century interpreter of the Constitution could not reliably claim to 
instinctively understand the terms in a 200-year-old document 
without additional study. Such an interpreter would need to gain basic 
familiarity with the historic English language. Canvassing how the 
relevant term was used to help define other words throughout a 
founding era English dictionary could be one tool to understand the 
potential wide range of meaning of that term in the distant past. Or it 
may help the interpreter to better discern how each of the dictionary’s 
listed definitions for the word are more likely to be utilized in the 
context of explaining other, perhaps related, words. 
That said, if using a dictionary as a mini corpus simply helps to 
give a little more context to an interpreter trying to choose from 
among multiple definitional options (i.e., the various senses) of a given 
term, is there any reason not to skip the dictionary and just head 
straight to a more broad-based corpus? Why devote any more time to 
a dictionary?  
For starters, dictionaries serve as a kind of catalog of language.11 
They provide somewhat encyclopedic coverage of terms used 
throughout the English language and often attempt to present 
language in a way that is “representative of their times.”12 Identifying 
evidence of the manner in which a particular word is used in relation 
to other terms throughout the entire range of the English language in 
the targeted, relatively concise, form of the dictionary13 may provide 
an excellent starting point for interpretation. 
In Part I, this Article first will catalog in greater depth the potential 
downfalls that scholars have identified about overreliance on 
dictionary definitions in constitutional and statutory interpretation. 
Part I then will continue to explain how a more comprehensive review 
of a dictionary as a mini corpus escapes some of those pitfalls and in 
fact complements more traditional corpus linguistics analysis.  
 
 11.  But see United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Judge 
Frank Easterbook’s description of a dictionary as a “historical catalog,” a description used by 
Judge Easterbrook and former Judge Richard Posner to contest the notion that dictionaries are 
a useful tool for statutory interpretation) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and 
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994)). 
 12. Carey McIntosh, Eighteenth-Century English Dictionaries and the Enlightenment, 28 
Y.B. ENG. STUD., 3, 3–4, 8–10 (1998) (noting also, however, some of the numerous problems 
with eighteenth-century dictionaries). 
 13. See infra notes 70, 93 and accompanying text. 
8.MASCOTT_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  4:09 PM 
1557 The Dictionary as a Specialized Corpus 
 1561 
For example, in working to flesh out the proper methodology for 
the use of corpus linguistics in constitutional interpretive research, 
Professor Lee Strang has suggested that a researcher should begin by 
canvassing the case law and legal scholarship to identify several 
possible meanings for the eighteenth-century constitutional term or 
phrase under review.14 He suggests the interpreter next should identify 
which of those meanings (or “senses”) is being utilized each time the 
term under review appears in the relevant corpus of documents that 
the researcher is studying.15 Professor Strang then suggests that 
empirical assessment of the frequency with which the corpus employs 
each potential meaning of the term may shed light on whether that 
particular definition in fact represents what the word most 
likely  meant.16  
In an article analyzing the eighteenth-century meaning of the 
term commerce, Professor Randy Barnett engaged in an approach 
similar to the method that Professor Strang describes.17  Professor 
Barnett examined every use of the word commerce from 1728–1800 
in a well-known founding era newspaper18 to determine which of two 
definitions of commerce debated in Supreme Court opinions was more 
likely correct—a narrower meaning encompassing just “trading 
activity” or a broader meaning including both “manufacturing and 
agriculture.”19  The absence of even a single unambiguous use of the 
word commerce to describe manufacturing or agriculture provided 
evidence that the eighteenth-century word commerce most likely 
referred to just “trading activity.”20 
But what if a researcher has to answer a more open-ended question 
about a word’s meaning rather than a binary inquiry such as whether 
 
 14. Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor: Using 
Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1181, 
1207–08 (2017). 
 15. See id. at 1209 (describing aspects of a possible method for analyzing the corpus via a 
“stable of potential conventions” for the  meaning of the term under review). 
 16. See id. 
 17. See generally Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce 
Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 855, 858 (2003). 
 18. See id. at 856–57. 
 19. See id. at 848–49, 857–58 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 20. See id. at 850, 858–62. 
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the eighteenth-century meaning of commerce encompassed 
“manufacturing and agriculture”?21 And what if modern cases stray so 
far from a term’s possible eighteenth-century meaning that plugging 
those distorted meanings into an eighteenth-century corpus search 
would be useless or misleading?22  
In those cases, careful examination of how dictionaries from the 
relevant time period used the term in the context of defining other 
language might help the interpreter gain insight into a fuller, more 
accurate range of plausible meanings to bear in mind during the 
interpreter’s analysis of his corpus. The dictionary’s use of the relevant 
word as it defines terms across the entire range of language might give 
an interpreter a more informed understanding of the word “from the 
ground up.”23 
After canvassing the potential pitfalls and benefits of dictionary 
usage in Part I, Part II of this Article will walk through specific 
examples demonstrating the interpretive benefits of using a dictionary 
corpus in both constitutional and statutory interpretation. It will 
describe the kind of information to be gleaned from using an 
eighteenth-century dictionary as a mini corpus to define the term 
officer, in comparison to the interpretive information available from a 
broader corpus investigation of the word. Part II also will demonstrate 
how consulting a dictionary as a mini corpus may benefit and 
strengthen even more modern statutory interpretation.  
In contemporary interpretation cases, judges have started to use 
corpus linguistics-style techniques to better understand statutory 
terms, such as former Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner’s use of 
 
 21. See, e.g., Mascott, supra note 2, at 47, 47 nn.270–73; cf. Mouritsen, supra note 2, at 
204–05 (noting that corpus linguistics analysis can be applied in a more straightforward fashion 
to a “neat, binary question of lexical ambiguity and ordinary meaning”). 
 22. See, e.g., Mascott, supra note 2, at 3–13 (describing how modern jurisprudence 
interpreting the Article II term “officer” has diverged from the most likely eighteenth-century 
meaning of the word); see also Strang, supra note 14, at 1208–09 (acknowledging the possibility 
that “our practice is so unmoored from the Constitution’s original meaning that none of the 
candidate conventions drawn from the practice will fit the evidence”; in such a case, at least 
where originalist research has already been done on the constitutional provision of interest, the 
researcher could consult the “secondary literature” to build the “stable” of plausible definitions 
for the term). 
 23. Mascott, supra note 2, at 47. 
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a form of collocation24 to understand the statutory term harbor.25 The 
tendency has been for judges to look for the most frequently employed 
sense of a word to discern the ordinary meaning of a statutory 
provision.26 But taking a quick snapshot of how the statutory term is 
used throughout a dictionary in defining language may suggest in 
some cases that the statutory term covers multiple compatible senses 
of the word27—not just the word’s most frequently used definition. 
Rather than trying to limit statutory meaning to the most frequently 
used meaning of a term, perhaps all permissible meanings (and 
subcategories) consistent with the statutory context should be seen as 
within a statute’s scope.  
For example, in contrast to Judge Posner’s conclusion in the 
harbor case, maybe to harbor includes both the behavior of intentional 
concealment as well as the provision of a place to stay.28 Similarly, the 
constitutional phrase “Officers of the United States” includes both 
principal and inferior Officers.29 And the statutory phrase 
“discharge . . . of [a] firearm” may encompass both a single shot and 
 
 24. See United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012) (examining the 
frequency of the use of the verb “harboring” in connection with various objects such as 
“enemies” or “refugees”); Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 25 (describing collocates as “word 
neighbors” that “allow one to search for the words that most commonly appear within a certain 
range of the key word or phrase”). 
 25. See infra notes 146–53 and accompanying text; see also Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 
28–29 (describing Judge Posner’s analysis of forms of the word “harbor”). 
 26. See, e.g., Costello, 666 F.3d at 1044 (relying on a Google search that indicated the 
word “harboring” had been used much more frequently in a way that described the concealment 
of people needing to hide (e.g., “harboring enemies”) than as part of a phrase indicating just 
provision of a “place to stay” (e.g., “harboring guests”)); see also Mouritsen, supra note 2, at 
196–99 (examining the frequency of usage of the word “enterprise” to refer to a “non-
economically motivated enterprise” as opposed to an “economically motivated one” as a method 
to help assess whether the “ordinary meaning” of “enterprise” carries with it an economic 
connotation) (emphasis omitted). 
 27. See infra notes 171–75 and accompanying text. 
 28. Cf. infra notes 173–75 and accompanying text. 
 29. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (indicating as a textual matter that within the larger 
class of “Officers of the United States” there is a subset of “inferior Officers”); see also, e.g., 
Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 658–69 (1997) (discussing the categories of principal 
and inferior officers subject to the Constitution’s Appointments Clause in Article II). The 
Appointments Clause’s applicability to both principal and inferior officers would not become 
any less legitimate if one were to run a corpus analysis and discover that the use of the phrase 
“Officers of the United States” more frequently referred to principal officers than to inferior 
officers. It always encompasses both kinds of officers, even though one of the two categories of 
officers might be more frequently discussed than the other. 
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a round of shots—which would mean it could be textually correct to 
charge a defendant with only one statutory offense for firing a burst 
of shots instead of charging separately for each and every bullet fired.30 
In this way, adopting an interpretive approach that views statutes as 
encompassing all categories of meaning consonant with the relevant 
statutory context may not necessarily lead to more criminalization or 
regulation—but to less. 
I. THE STRENGTHS OF DICTIONARIES AS CORPORA 
Scholars and jurists have expressed concern about the dangers of 
overreliance on dictionary definitions when trying to understand the 
meaning of a term either in the Constitution or in a rank-and-file 
question of statutory interpretation.31 Stephen Mouritsen has done 
extensive work unearthing essential insight into the relevant, but quite 
limited, information available from dictionary definition entries in 
statutory interpretation cases.32 And in an article explaining the proper 
limited role of founding era dictionaries in constitutional 
interpretation, Professor Gregory Maggs identified six potential 
problems with reliance on founding era dictionaries in particular.33 He 
describes them as the following: “(1) insufficiency, (2) 
incompleteness, (3) inapplicability, (4) inconsistency, (5) imprecision, 
and (6) incorrectness.”34 
Referencing a dictionary as a corpus, however, may help to 
overcome some of these challenges. First, the problem of 
“insufficiency” arises only where an interpreter relies solely on a term’s 
dictionary definition to determine its meaning.35 The second problem, 
“incompleteness,” is a little broader. It refers to the fact that a 
 
 30. See infra note 175 and accompanying text; cf. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶¶ 1–
6, 356 P.3d 1258, 1261–62 (interpreting Utah Code section 76-10-508(1)(a) (“A person may 
not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm . . . .”); id. at 1281–82 (Lee, 
J.,  concurring). 
 31. See supra notes 1, 6 and accompanying text; see also Solan & Gales, supra note 10, at 
3 (describing criticisms of dictionary use). 
 32. See generally Mouritsen, supra note 1; Mouritsen, supra note 2. 
 33. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era 
to Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358, 359–
61  (2014). 
 34. Id. at 361. 
 35. See id. at 368–69. 
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dictionary definition may not list every possible meaning of a term 
because of space constraints or the author’s views that a particular 
usage is inaccurate.36 On this point, examination of multiple 
dictionaries37—or investigation of a dictionary as a corpus—may be 
helpful. A dictionary author may use the term under review in the 
context of defining other words, thereby inadvertently providing 
insight into a different or more nuanced definition omitted from the 
dictionary entry for the term itself. 
The other four concerns raised by Professor Maggs also may be 
addressed by looking at sources other than just a single dictionary’s 
definition. For instance, an ordinary dictionary’s definition may be 
inapplicable because the Constitution was employing a term with a 
specialized legal meaning not found in the particular dictionary the 
interpreter referenced.38 Or it may be imprecise because when 
compiling dictionaries, lexicographers at times “[chose] broad 
definitions that cover several possible meanings” rather than specifying 
every single possible meaning of the term.39 Professor Maggs suggests 
these concerns can be ameliorated by consulting multiple 
dictionaries40 or founding era legal dictionaries41 in addition to 
ordinary language  dictionaries. 
In addition to the techniques suggested by Professor Maggs, 
consulting a dictionary as a mini corpus may assist an interpreter, 
particularly in cases of imprecision. Numerous additional distinct 
 
 36. See id. at 369–73. 
 37. See, e.g., id. at 371–72 (observing that the constitutional meaning of the term 
“capitation” was missing from the definition of the term in Samuel Johnson’s dictionary but 
present in John Ash’s dictionary). 
 38. See id. at 374. 
 39. Id. at 378. 
 40. Id. at 372–73. In contrast to Professor Maggs’s suggestion that consulting multiple 
dictionaries may address the pitfalls of relying on just one dictionary, Stephen Mouritsen has 
contended that multiple dictionaries are unlikely to provide additional insight because no 
dictionary author wants to diverge too far from the definitions used by competitors. See 
Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1943–44. Therefore, Mouritsen contends dictionary authors may 
really represent only one point of view, rather than seeking to uncover the widest possible range 
of meanings of the given term. See id. at 1941–45. But examining a dictionary as a corpus might 
address Mouritsen’s concern. Additional senses of a term may be apparent from a dictionary 
author’s inadvertent use of that term in the context of defining another word, which could reveal 
the term has more possible meanings than just those the author was willing to directly state in 
the definition for the term itself. 
 41. Maggs, supra note 33, at 375. 
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shades of meaning (not included in the actual definition of the term) 
might be apparent by the term’s use within the context of other 
dictionary definitions. Using one, or even multiple, dictionaries as a 
specialized corpus could help ensure no relevant usage of a term is 
missed. For example, in a recent research project to identify the 
meaning of officer in the late eighteenth century, I used the popular 
Nathan Bailey’s dictionary42 as a mini corpus.43 The dictionary’s entry 
for the term officer told the reader only that an “Officer” was “one 
who is in an office.”44 But in the course of searching for the word 
officer in the dictionary’s definitions of all other words, I came across 
more than 500 instances of use of the terms office(s) and officer(s).45 
These uses indicated that the terms officer and office encompassed an 
enormously wide scope of governmental positions, ranging from “The 
Lord President [of the King’s Council],” an apparently important 
“officer of the Crown” who was “to propose business at the Council-
Table,” down to the “Swabber,” “an inferior officer on board a ship 
of war” whose “office” was “to take care that the ship be kept clean.”46 
Professor Maggs provides the additional cautionary warning that 
researchers should not apply inconsistent methodology in their use of 
dictionaries—such as by consulting multiple dictionaries about one 
contested term but only a single dictionary for another.47 Further, he 
notes that, at times, definitions in founding era dictionaries have been 
found to be just plain incorrect through the author’s inadvertent 
mistake or incorporation of obsolete meanings.48 Other scholars have 
echoed this concern that reliance on the use of words by too few 
speakers, such as a single dictionary author, may give undue weight to 
an author with an idiosyncratic view.49 To account for these concerns, 
 
 42. N. BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Edward 
Harwood ed., 25th ed. 1790). 
 43. See Mascott, supra note 2, Section II.B.2; id. at 38 n.209. 
 44. See id. at 40, 40 n.220 (internal quotations omitted). 
 45. See id. at 43. 
 46. See id. Section II.B.2; see also BAILEY, supra note 42 (defining “Swabber” as “an 
inferior officer on board a ship of war, whose office is to take care that the ship be kept clean”); 
id. (defining, under the letter “P,” “The Lord President [of the King’s Council]” as “an officer 
of the Crown, who is to attend the Sovereign to propose business at the Council-Table, and to 
report the several transactions there managed”). 
 47. See Maggs, supra note 33, at 377–78. 
 48. See id. at 380–81. 
 49. See Solan & Gales, supra note 10, at 3–5. 
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interpreters of course should view examination of a dictionary corpus 
as just one tool in the toolbox. But it is a very useful tool. 
Former Judge Richard Posner, who has extensively theorized 
about statutory interpretation, has raised the additional complication 
that “[d]ictionary definitions are acontextual.”50 This is a key concern 
because to really understand a term, interpreters must pay “careful 
attention to the nuances and specialized connotations that speakers of 
the relevant language attach to particular words and phrases in the 
context in which they are being used.”51 
A dictionary’s use as a mini corpus alleviates this particular 
difficulty, however, inasmuch as uses of the contested term within 
definitions for other words are in fact contextual. For example, an 
interpreter seeking to understand whether the term enterprise carries 
a connotation of “economic motivation”52 may gain insight from 
examining a dictionary’s contextual use of the word enterprise to 
define other terms. Contextual uses of the term enterprise throughout 
Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary53 show the word carries 
 
 50. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 51. Id. (quoting John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise 
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1704 (2004)). 
 52. See Mouritsen, supra note 2, at 180 (using corpus linguistics techniques to evaluate 
whether the term “enterprise” in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO) includes within its scope only organizations with an “economic motivation”). Mr. 
Mouritsen’s statistical analysis led him to conclude that the word “enterprise” is used 
overwhelmingly to refer to economically motivated organizations. See id. at 196–202. But the 
more than seventy uses of variants of the word “enterprise” to define other words in Webster’s 
Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (7th ed. 1963) had both economic and noneconomic 
connotations, see infra notes 53–57, falling more in line with the linguistics studies critiqued by 
Mr. Mouritsen, which had declined to define “enterprise” in primarily economic terms, see 
Mouritsen, supra note 2, at 185–86. Nonetheless, Mr. Mouritsen’s ultimate conclusion that the 
RICO statute criminalizes economic activity likely is correct—but more because the context 
surrounding the statutory term “enterprise” seems to suggest it refers to economic activity, not 
because the word “enterprise” inherently has that limited meaning. See id. at 184–85; see also 18 
U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with 
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to 
conduct . . . such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of 
unlawful debt.” (emphasis added)). 
 53. WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1963), https://ia800503
.us.archive.org/32/items/webstersseventhn00unse/webstersseventhn00unse.pdf [hereinafter 
WEBSTER’S]. This collegiate dictionary represents that it is based on Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary, id., a dictionary much maligned by Justice Antonin Scalia, see Antonin 
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, A Note on the Use of Dictionaries, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 419, 427 (2013) 
(describing Webster’s Third International Dictionary as “a dictionary to be used cautiously 
because of its frequent inclusion of doubtful, slip-shod meanings without adequate usage 
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with it both economic and noneconomic meanings. The dictionary 
defines (i) an adventurer to be “one that engages in risky commercial 
enterprises for profit”54 and (ii) a cartel as “a combination of 
independent commercial enterprises designed to limit compe-
tition”55—both uses that connote a commercial endeavor. But it also 
defines management as “the collective body of those who manage or 
direct an enterprise”56 and a jumping-off place as “a place from which 
an enterprise is launched”57—uses that suggest an enterprise can be any 
type of collective venture. 
Corpus linguistics scholars generally have preferred “naturally 
occurring” samples of language58 over dictionaries. The thinking is 
that dictionary definitions exist primarily to inform language study 
and thus are somewhat contrived.59 In contrast, writers and speakers 
generating documents typically found in a corpus, like newspapers and 
letters, did not necessarily write or speak intending their words to 
be  used as evidence of a particular term’s meaning.60 Therefore, 
these  word uses are more genuine, better reflecting a term’s 
ordinary  meaning. 
 
notes”). Nonetheless, this Article utilizes the collegiate dictionary because it is freely available 
on the Internet, thus making it possible for readers to easily access the cited dictionary and 
replicate this paper’s analysis. For purposes of simply illustrating the possible interpretive 
information to be gleaned from use of a dictionary as a corpus, this collegiate dictionary is 
adequate. A spreadsheet cataloging the dictionary’s uses of variants of the term enterprise is 
available at https://drive.google.com/drive/u/3/folders/1c-55oJnBDue8I3XFelYiPVjUkb
DjI7Kv. 
 54. WEBSTER’S, supra note 53, at 13 (including this meaning as one of the definitions of 
the term adventurer) (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. at 128 (including this meaning as one of the definitions of the term cartel) 
(emphasis added). 
 56. Id. at 513 (including this meaning as one of the definitions of the term management). 
 57. Id. at 460 (including this meaning as one of the definitions of the phrase jumping-
off  place). 
 58. See Mouritsen, supra note 2, at 190. 
 59. See id. at 170 (observing that dictionary authors intend to set forth all permissible 
meanings of a given word without regard to the frequency of use of a particular meaning and 
without attempting to address “what meaning a word must bear in a particular context” 
(quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 1190 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P 
Frickey eds., 1994))). 
 60. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1954–55 (“[D]ata in a corpus are considered ‘natural’ 
because they were not elicited for the purpose of study. That is, generally no one asks the speakers 
or writers whose words are represented in the corpus to speak or write for the purpose of 
subjecting their words to linguistic scrutiny.”). 
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But use of dictionaries as a corpus ameliorates this disparity. A 
dictionary author’s use of a particular word within its definitions for 
other terms is not intended to influence the public’s perception of the 
contested word. Rather, the author inadvertently referenced the 
contested term in the course of trying to define another word. As 
such, the contested term’s use in a dictionary corpus is at least 
somewhat less skewed evidence than the dictionary entry for the 
term  itself. 
The real benefit of turning to dictionaries as a specialized corpus, 
however, may be their potential for increasing an interpreter’s 
understanding of the range of permissible meanings of a contested 
term. Scholars agree that one legitimate use of dictionaries is to 
demonstrate that a certain meaning of a word is permissible.61 
Professor Lee Strang builds on this idea by suggesting that 
constitutional analysis in particular may benefit from interpreters first 
identifying the range of potential meanings associated with the term 
in question.62 Specifically, Professor Strang explains that scholars may 
build this “stable of possible language conventions” by looking at 
Supreme Court case law defining the relevant term, studying prior 
scholarship on the term, or “conducting a pilot study of the corpus” 
to see what relevant meanings are contained within primary and 
secondary sources.63 Equipped with a well-developed list of meanings 
that “plausibly fit the studied text,” the scholar can then test those 
meanings to see which has the “best fit” with the relevant corpus.64 
Here again, examination of a dictionary as a corpus could be 
immensely useful. A dictionary attempts to define terms throughout 
the entire range of language. Examining how the term of interest is 
used in relationship to multiple other words (in the context of defining 
those words) could assist in the compilation of a complete stable of 
 
 61. See id. at 1921–23 (contrasting this with the use of a dictionary to prove that one of 
the permissible meanings is the most typical, or the most likely, ordinary meaning of the word); 
Maggs, supra note 33, at 359–61, 364–67 (suggesting that founding era dictionaries may 
provide evidence relevant to interpreters seeking to discern several different types of original 
meaning of the Constitution—despite dictionaries’ potential pitfalls). 
 62. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1207–09. 
 63. Id. at 1207–08. 
 64. Id. at 1207–09, 1228. 
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potential meanings of a term.65 Such an examination may identify 
meanings that are not immediately apparent from existing case law or 
scholarship. Or it may identify meanings that were excluded from the 
dictionary’s definition of the term under review, as that term’s 
definitional entry may not capture every nuance available from seeing 
the term used in context.66 Just like “computer-assisted” research 
techniques in general,67 a comprehensive search of a dictionary corpus 
helps identify a potentially wide range of meanings of a term. 
Examination of dictionary corpora also preserves an additional 
corpus linguistics-related benefit cited by judges and scholars. Justice 
Thomas R. Lee has praised corpus linguistics analysis as being “subject 
to replication” because it utilizes a “transparent database that is 
publicly available.”68 This is superior to earlier, conventional styles of 
statutory and constitutional analysis in which an interpreter might 
“cherry pick” and selectively cite evidence supportive of his 
interpretation.69 Similarly, a corpus linguistics-style analysis of every 
use of a term in one dictionary, or set of dictionaries, also is replicable 
and transparent. Any follow-on researcher can access the cited 
dictionary and examine its contextual uses of the contested term to 
verify whether they support the interpreter’s position. 
Even if dictionaries fail to reflect the true, contemporary usage of 
a word,70 they nonetheless are a huge part of our culture’s “common 
linguistic experience”—which is what makes objective statutory and 
constitutional interpretation possible in the first place.71 Dictionaries 
 
 65. Cf. id. at 1207–08 (observing that “a pilot study of the corpus” or review of the 
“secondary literature on the subject” might be helpful if case law and current legal practice do 
not seem to provide “plausible conventions” for the eighteenth-century meaning of the relevant 
constitutional term or phrase). 
 66. See Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 23 (“Context matters, and dictionaries (especially 
from the Founding Era) do not capture context . . . .”). 
 67. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1204–07 (describing the use of “[c]omputer-assisted 
research techniques” in originalism). 
 68. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶ 93, 356 P.3d 1258, 1282 (Utah 2015) (Lee, 
J.,  concurring). 
 69. See Barnett, supra note 17, at 856, 856  n.30 (describing the difficulty in the past of 
“know[ing] whether the evidence of usage offered by a particular historian was typical or cherry-
picked” prior to the advent of the wide availability of electronic founding era sources). 
 70. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1922–24, 1931–32 (noting the shortcomings of a 
dictionary in determining a word’s ordinary usage). 
 71. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1220–22 (concluding that eighteenth-century Americans 
had a sufficiently “common linguistic experience” through the circulation of newspapers and 
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are routinely consulted as evidence of a word’s linguistic meaning.72 
Whether or not a particular dictionary accurately reflected the 
meaning of a term at the time it was written, that dictionary certainly 
will have a prospective influence on words’ meanings. Just as courts 
reference dictionaries to assist in statutory interpretation, ordinary 
citizens access dictionaries to acquire greater insight into the meaning 
of particular words. As dictionaries are likely to shape the meaning of 
words moving forward in time from their publication and circulation, 
they must be consulted by anyone seeking to uncover how an 
educated English speaker would understand the studied term.73 
Comprehensive examination of a dictionary as a corpus is a great 
means for acquiring a more textured and in-depth understanding of 
a  word. 
One final concern raised about founding era dictionaries, in 
particular, is that their authors often engaged in what today would be 
considered plagiarism74—cribbing at least in part from earlier 
dictionaries. Therefore, founding era dictionary definitions may not 
necessarily reflect an author’s attempt to accurately and independently 
characterize the correct contemporary meaning of a term as of the 
time the author was compiling the dictionary.75 Founding era 
 
their wide familiarity with certain texts like the Bible that it is possible to discern a nationwide 
objective meaning of the Constitution); cf. McIntosh, supra note 12, at 4 (noting that founding 
era dictionaries were “intended for a wide current readership” and the “compilers of dictionaries 
and the booksellers who offered dictionaries to the public would not have printed one that 
seemed completely out of touch with current usage”). 
 72. See Maggs, supra note 33, at 359–60; Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 30 (noting that 
both lawyers and judges use dictionaries and the potential fallacies of dictionary usage do “not 
mean we should not use dictionaries” but simply that “we should strive to use them better”); 
Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1915–16 (describing judges’ reliance on dictionaries). 
 73. Cf. Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 21–22 (“Original public meaning originalism . . . 
seeks to determine ‘the meaning the words and phrases of the Constitution would have had, in 
context, to ordinary readers, speakers, and writers of the English language, reading a document 
of this type, at the time adopted.’” (quoting Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 
1118  (2003))). 
 74. See Maggs, supra note 33, at 383–84 (reporting that Samuel Johnson and one of the 
compilers of Nathan Bailey’s dictionaries may have relied on each other’s efforts when compiling 
their respective dictionaries); McIntosh, supra note 12, at 3–4 (“[E]very eighteenth-century 
dictionary drew heavily on its predecessors, sometimes lifting definitions word-for-word from 
books published fifty years earlier or more.”). 
 75. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1943–44 (questioning the independence of dictionary 
authors because “the history of English lexicography usually consists of a recital of successive 
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dictionaries like Samuel Johnson’s dictionary also included sample 
uses of words from very old, non-contemporaneous texts like the Bible 
or works by Shakespeare.76 But such a critique evaluates dictionaries 
simply as reflections of some kind of contemporary, objectively correct 
word meaning—suggesting they are inaccurate reflections at best. It 
neglects to account for the idea that widely available dictionaries may 
have been powerful influencers of word meaning moving forward.77 
Not only would William Shakespeare and the Bible have remained 
influential sources of understanding in the founding era,78 the very fact 
that an eighteenth-century dictionary incorporated particular word 
meanings may have had great influence on a learned writer’s sense of 
the meaning of language in 1787 and 1788. 
II. EXAMPLES OF DICTIONARIES AS A MINI CORPUS, IN PRACTICE 
Part II of this Article will provide concrete examples of some of 
the interpretive benefits of consulting dictionaries as corpora. First, in 
constitutional interpretation, examination of the specialized corpus of 
Nathan Bailey’s founding era dictionary79 provides detailed insight 
into the vast scope of government officials viewed as officers in the 
eighteenth century. Second, examination of a contemporary 
dictionary’s contextual references to the term harbor—a contested 
statutory term in a recent federal appeals court case—shows how the 
use of dictionaries as a corpus may provide an in-depth, textured 
starting point to discerning ordinary meaning.80 
 
and often successful acts of piracy” (internal quotation omitted)); Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 
23 (observing that founding era dictionaries “are more likely to reflect what words meant in the 
early 1600s than the late 1700s” because many of them were “based on Samuel Johnson’s 
Dictionary,” which in turn “heavily relied on earlier sources”). 
 76. See, e.g., SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 
1768) (citing the Bible as the source for one of its definitions of “artillery” and Shakespeare as 
its source for the meaning of “all-cheering”), https://books.google.com/books/about/A
_Dictionary_of_the_English_Language.html?id=03Q7AAAAcAAJ. 
 77. Cf. McIntosh, supra note 12, at 4 (referring to dictionaries as “intended for a wide 
current readership”). 
 78. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1221 (noting that the Bible “was a staple throughout 
the nation” in the founding era). 
 79. BAILEY, supra note 42. 
 80. See infra Section II.B. 
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A. Constitutional Interpretation: Article II Term Officer 
In recent work, I analyzed the meaning of the term officers in 
Article II of the Constitution.81 Examination of every use of the terms 
office(s) and officer(s) in a founding era dictionary imparted a range of 
understanding of the term that expanded on the information about 
officers available from a more traditional corpus linguistics-
style  analysis.82 
Article II permits only four specific appointment methods for 
“Officers of the United States.”83 As an initial matter, corpus 
linguistics-style analysis was critical in determining that the phrase 
“Officers of the United States” was not a new term of art setting aside 
an especially important group of government positions. Rather, 
evidence suggested the phrase referenced a class of federal-level, as 
opposed to state-level, officers.84 
This conclusion was supported by the Article II drafting history as 
well as a key-word-in-context (KWIC)-style analysis of every use of 
the phrase “Officer(s) of the United States” in a specialized corpus.85 
Specifically, that research indicated the phrase “Officers of the United 
States” first came into use during the Continental Congress era and 
was used to describe officers in the Continental Army.86 Multiple 
speakers described the group of “Officers of the United States” using 
different phrasing like “officers of the government” or “officers of the 
union,” suggesting the precise Article II phrasing did not constitute a 
 
 81. See generally Mascott, supra note 2. 
 82. See id. Section II.B.2. 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but 
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, 
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). 
 84. See Mascott, supra note 2, Section II.A.2. 
 85. See id.; see also Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 24–25 (discussing the use of specialized 
corpora, including Professor Randy Barnett’s use of the Pennsylvania Gazette as a specialized 
corpus). This specialized corpus consisted primarily of legally significant documents traditionally 
viewed as relevant to originalist analysis such as the Constitution, Articles of Confederation, one 
Readex database of eighteenth-century newspapers, the Journals of the Continental Congress, 
the Federalist and anti-Federalist essays, and the drafting and ratification debates. See Mascott, 
supra note 2, Part II. 
 86. See Mascott, supra note 2, Section II.A.2.e. 
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term of art.87 Moreover, there were relatively few references to the full 
phrase “Officers of the United States” in a specialized corpus of 
documents related to the Constitution’s formation, suggesting the 
framers did not believe they were creating a specialized new level of 
federal official in the Appointments Clause.88 For example, out of 
approximately 600 uses of office[s] and officer[s] in The Federalist 
Papers and anti-Federalist essays, the phrase “Officer(s) of the United 
States” appeared only thirteen times.89 
Elimination of the likelihood that “Officers of the United States” 
was a new term of art creating a special subcategory of officials was a 
significant contribution of the corpus analysis. It suggested that 
research into the meaning of the individual term officer was relevant 
for determining the scope of government officials subject to 
the  Appointments Clause requirements for “Officers of the 
United  States.” 
But the question remained—how would speakers of eighteenth-
century English have defined the term officer? What is the full range 
of federal officials that came within the scope of the phrase “Officers 
of the United States” at the time of the Constitution’s formation? 
Identifying the entire scope of federal officials encompassed by the 
Article II Appointments Clause in some ways is a different type of 
interpretive question than the kind that judges and courts previously 
have evaluated utilizing corpus linguistics methods.90 For example, the 
Supreme Court in 2010 evaluated whether the word personal 
ordinarily includes a reference to corporations.91 In addition, Justice 
Thomas R. Lee of the Utah Supreme Court conducted an empirical 
corpus linguistics analysis of whether the term discharge more 
 
 87. See id. Part II.A.2.c (internal quotations omitted). 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id.; Mascott, Who are “Officers of the United States”?: Appendix, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 4–5) (available at  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2918956 [hereinafter Appendix] (depicting this data based on a search using 
the AntConc corpus linguistics research platform). See Anthony, L. (2014), AntConc (Version 
3.4.4w (Windows)) [Computer Software], Tokyo, Japan: Waseda University, http://www. 
laurenceanthony.net/. 
  90.  See Mascott, supra note 2, at 47. 
 91. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1955 n.224 (discussing the debate over “personal 
privacy” in FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011)). 
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ordinarily means one single shot or multiple shots.92 These binary 
questions lend themselves to the empirical analysis of which one of 
two possible answers to the legal question is more probable based on 
the most common usage of a term.93 But what if an interpreter is trying 
to uncover the definition of a term “from the ground up”?94 
Applying Professor Strang’s methodology of identifying a “stable 
of possible language conventions”95 to a search for the eighteenth-
century meaning of officer would lead to the identification of several 
initial possible meanings for the term. Current Supreme Court 
doctrine suggests officers have “significant authority”;96 Executive 
Branch research suggests that officers hold a “continuing” position 
that has been delegated “a portion of the sovereign powers of the 
federal Government”;97 and legal scholarship suggests, in one instance, 
that officers are those with continuing sovereign authority delegated 
by statute.98 But none of these standards provides much direction due 
to lack of specificity, and evidence suggests that none of the standards 
is entirely accurate, at least as an original matter.99 
So how would an interpreter make sure to uncover all possible 
language conventions defining officer and determine the full range of 
officials coming within that definition? Professor Lee Strang suggests 
an initial search of primary and secondary sources may be beneficial.100 
Another possible starting point could be to consult a dictionary. 
In this case, as one might expect, examination of founding era 
dictionary entries for “office(r)” was not immediately instructive. 
Multiple founding era dictionaries defined “officer” simply as a “man 
 
 92. See State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶¶ 54–88, 356 P.3d 1258, 1275–82 (Lee, 
J.,  concurring). 
 93. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 47, 47 n.271; Mouritsen, supra note 2, at 196, 204–05 
(describing how binary questions about a word’s meaning are readily compatible with a 
straightforward empirical corpus linguistics analysis). 
  94.  See Mascott, supra note 2, at 47. 
 95. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1207–08. 
 96. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125–26 (1976). 
 97. See Steven G. Bradbury, Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the 
Appointments Clause, 31 OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNS. 73, 73, 77 (2007). 
 98. Stacy M. Lindstedt, Developing the Duffy Defect: Identifying Which Government 
Workers Are Constitutionally Required to be Appointed, 76 MO. L. REV. 1143, 1177–78 (2011). 
 99. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 3–13. 
 100. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1207. 
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employed by the publick”;101 Nathan Bailey’s 1783 dictionary defined 
“officer” even more simply as “one who is in an office.”102 
But use of a founding era dictionary as a corpus was highly 
informative. In particular, I examined each of the more than 500 
references to office and officer in the twenty-fifth edition of Nathan 
Bailey’s dictionary from 1783103—thought to be “the bestselling 
dictionary of the eighteenth century.”104 Bailey’s dictionary has 
received praise for working “to include common words and to define 
words as they were actually used.”105 In particular, the dictionary’s 
introduction admonished that it ought “to be the special Care and 
Study of every one” to “get a true and distinct Idea of the proper 
Sense and Meaning of Words, and Terms of Art, in which they are 
expressed, without which no good Progress can be made.”106 The 
dictionary editor then marketed the dictionary as helping people 
better understand the entirety of language107 by eliminating the 
redundancies in other dictionaries and adding “several thousand 
English words and phrases” that had not appeared previously in any 
English dictionary.108  
Regardless of whether Bailey’s twenty-fifth edition suffered from 
some of the typical founding era dictionary ailments like incorrectness, 
it certainly was intended to shape the public meaning of the terms that 
it defined. Thus, the dictionary is relevant in assessing the culturally 
 
 101. Mascott, supra note 2, at 39. Alternate senses of the word were “a commander in the 
army” or “one who has the power of apprehending criminals.” See id. at 39, 39 n.211. But it is 
apparent from the surrounding context of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, that the Appointments 
Clause is broader than just referencing military commanders or law enforcement. See U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Consequently, the sense of the word relevant to this clause is “man employed 
by the publick.” See Mascott, supra note 2, at 39, 39 n.211. 
 102. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 40 n.220. 
 103. See id. at 38, 43. 
 104. Maggs, supra note 33, at 383. 
 105. See id. 
 106. BAILEY, supra note 42, at vii. 
 107. Id. at vi (“It has therefore been the universal Practice of all polite Nations, to make 
the Study of Letters the first Business of Life: And because this Accomplishment is necessary to 
all Persons, and but few, comparatively speaking, have the Advantage of a learned Education to 
any considerable Proficiency, Dictionaries have in all Languages been compiled, to which, as to 
Storehouses, such Persons may have Recourse, as often as any Thing occurs in Conversation or 
Reading, with which they are unacquainted, or when they themselves would speak or write 
properly and intelligibly.”). 
 108. Id. at xii. 
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shared understanding of words at the time the Constitution was 
drafted and ratified—several years after the dictionary’s publication 
in  1783. 
In contrast to Bailey’s definitions of the terms officer and office 
themselves,109 his use of these words in context to define other terms 
greatly informs the understanding of the broad scope of founding era 
officials considered to be officers. The dictionary described numerous 
officials as “officers” or as holding “offices” even when their jobs 
consisted of recordkeeping, assisting higher-level officials, and 
performing menial tasks110 that seem to fall below the current Supreme 
Court’s standard of “significant authority.”111 
Following is a partial list of such officials:112 
Record-Keepers: (i) “Corrector [of the Staple]”: recorded 
bargains by merchants in a public store-house; (ii) “Purser” on the 
king’s ship: provided food and bedding supplies to people on board 
the ship and kept track of crew member pay; (iii) “Clerk of the Acts”: 
registered orders by the Commissioners of the Navy and received 
warrants and commissions; (iv) “Clerk of the Ordinance”: recorded 
the names of officers and government orders; (v) “Clerk of the Peace”: 
read indictments and enrolled government acts; (vi) “Clerk of the 
Pells”: recorded bills on a parchment roll. 
Assistants: (i) “[M]essengers [of the Exchequer]”: “attend[ed] the 
Lord Treasurer, and carr[ied] his letters and orders”; (ii) “Satellites, 
Life-Guards, or Officers: attend[ed] upon a Prince”; (iii) “Sword-
bearers”: “carrie[d] the sword of state before a magistrate.” 
Officials with Menial Duties: (i) “Agistator”: “took cattle into the 
forest”; (ii) “Ale-Conner/Ale-Taster”: tested the “goodness of bread 
[and] ale”; (iii) “Assay Master”: weighed bullion to make sure it was 
“according to the national standard”; (iv) “Beadle”: made 
“garnishments for the courts of the forest”; (v) “Botiler/Butler”: 
provided the king with wine; (vi) “Chafe-Wax”: “fit[ted] the wax for 
 
 109. Id. (“Duty”: “any Thing that one is obliged to do; a publick Tax.”; “Officer”: “one 
who is in an Office”; “Office”: “the Part or Duty of that which befits, or is to be expected from 
one; a Place or Employment; also a good or ill Turn.”). 
 110. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 43–46. 
 111. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991) (concluding that it was 
relevant to Article II “officer” status whether an official exercises “significant discretion” or 
“perform[s] more than ministerial tasks”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125–26 (1976). 
 112. The terms in the next three paragraphs and their descriptions, often verbatim, are 
taken from Mascott, supra note 2, at 43–46. 
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the sealing of writs”; (vii) “Expenditor”: “a steward or officer, who 
look[ed] after the repairs of the banks of [a] [m]arsh”; (viii) 
“Gauger[s]”: measured liquids on merchant ships; (ix) “Searcher[s]”: 
examined and marked defects on cloth; (x) “Sewer”: placed the meat 
on the table of the King or a Nobleman; (xi) “Swabber[s]”: 
cleaned  warships. 
The detailed nature of the picture of officers that emerges from 
this review of Nathan Bailey’s dictionary adds even to the depth of 
information available from studying a specialized corpus of key 
founding era documents that debated the meaning of the 
Constitution.113 Numerous statements from this specialized corpus 
suggest the eighteenth-century public would have understood officers 
to include many government officials including those with less 
significant duties.114 For instance, a speaker in the North Carolina 
ratifying convention described “petty officers with ‘trifling’ duties.”115 
And statements during the convention to draft the Constitution 
referenced “ministerial officers” and suggested the Appointments 
Clause applied to officials with duties as minor as those of “tide-
waiter[s]” who monitor the unloading of imported goods.116 But no 
statement in the specialized corpus purported to identify a 
comprehensive group of officials falling under the term officers. 
Similarly, evidence from the mini corpus of Bailey’s dictionary 
builds upon the understanding of officer available from a more typical, 
broad-based corpus linguistics study incorporating a variety of more 
everyday texts. Scholars are building a new Corpus of founding era 
American English (COFEA), which will give constitutional 
interpreters access to “at least 100 million words”117 from a 
representative set of founding era texts.118 COFEA-affiliated scholars 
generously provided me with access to more than 16,000 documents 
from the papers of various founding fathers that the COFEA 
developers acquired from http://founders.archives.gov and 
 
 113.  See supra note 85. 
 114.  See supra note 85. 
 115.  Mascott, supra note 2, at 49, 49 n.280. 
 116. Id. at 50 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
 117. Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 31. 
 118. Id. at 22, 31; see also Mascott, supra note 2, at 56. 
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converted to text files for use in corpus linguistics software.119 This 
particular group of documents ranged primarily from 1783 to 1789 
and included letters, diaries, and speech texts,120 providing the 
representative types of naturally occurring communicative sources 
desirable in corpus analysis.121 
A sampling122 of references to office(s) and officer(s) in these 
documents provided useful but limited information helping to flesh 
out the eighteenth-century meaning of “officer.” Within these 
“naturally occurring” documents the phrase “Officer(s) of the United 
States” occurred only ten times—exclusively in duplicate materials 
already included in my specialized founding era corpus.123 In contrast, 
 
 119. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 56. These documents are available on Google Drive at 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BwymGPo3iNE4TUJScjNFQnU4a0k in a sub-folder 
labeled “Confederacy files/text/”. 
 120. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 56; see also the spreadsheet labeled 
“Confederacyindex17831789.xls” located within the folder labeled “Confederacy files” at the 
Google site listed in supra note 119. The COFEA developers created this spreadsheet, which 
lists the date, title, and source of each of the 16,000 documents. 
 121. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1955 (describing the compilation of a typical corpus 
as including “newspapers, books, transcripts of conversations, or interviews”). 
 122. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1206 (suggesting that a researcher “may randomly 
sample” results if “search returns are too large to manage effectively”); cf. Mouritsen, supra note 
1, at 1958 (examining a random sample of 500 of one corpus’s 82,687 references to the word 
“carry”); Solan & Gales, supra note 10, at 13 (sampling the “even numbered occurrences” of 
the uses of a particular term). 
 123. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 57; see also Appendix, supra note 89, at 9 (including 
screen shots depicting these search results). The documents also included four additional 
references to the proper noun phrase, “Loan Officer of the United States” (or “of the U.S.”). 
See Report of a Committee to Establish a Land Office, 30 April 1784, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-0148 (last modified Nov. 26, 
2017) (file labeled “228716-body.txt”); Report Concerning Continental Bills of Credit, [7 May 
1784], FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-
0157 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “228758-body.txt”); To George Washington 
from John Hopkins, 10 April 1789, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/ 
documents/Washington/05-02-02-0044 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “243663-
body.txt”); To James Madison from John Hopkins, 10 April 1789, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-12-02-0048 (last modified Nov. 26, 
2017) (file labeled “243665-body.txt”). The other ten uses of “Officer(s) of the United States” 
arose during the Constitutional Convention or the ratification debates or within essays from The 
Federalist Papers—duplicates of sources my specialized corpus already contained. See supra note 
85 and accompanying text; see also Constitutional Convention. Plan of Government, [18 June 
1787], FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-
0099 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “237557-body.txt”); The Federalist Number 
44, [25 January] 1788, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents
/Madison/01-10-02-0251 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “239831-body.txt”); The 
Federalist No. 67, [11 March 1788], FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/ 
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within just this seven-year period of documents, the terms office and 
officer occurred 5,897 times124—arguably an unwieldy quantity of 
concordance lines to meaningfully examine. So, to get a quick sense 
of the range of usages of office(s) and officer(s) in this corpus I 
examined the first 200 concordance lines containing those terms.125 
In the vast majority of cases across this sample, the term officer 
referred to military positions. Scores of those military officer references 
included no immediate context describing their particular rank or 
authority level.126 Some references were a little more revealing, 
showing that a fairly wide range of military positions were considered 
to be “officer” positions. For instance, the words officer and office 
described people with positions ranging from brigadier general,127 to 
 
documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0217 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (two uses) (file labeled 
“240320-body.txt”); The Federalist No. 69, [14 March 1788], FOUNDERS ONLINE, http:// 
founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-0220 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) 
(two uses) (file labeled “240342-body.txt”); The Federalist No. 76, [1 April 1788], FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Hamilton/01-04-02-0228 (last modified 
Nov. 26, 2017) (two uses) (file labeled “240473-body.txt”); The Federalist No. 77, [2 April 
1788], FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-04-02-
0229 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “240477-body.txt”); New York Ratifying 
Convention. Fourth Speech of June 28 (John McKesson’s Version), [28 June 1788], FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-05-02-0012-0044 (file 
labeled “241222-body.txt”). 
 124. See Mascott, supra note 2, at 56; see also Appendix, supra note 89, at 8 (depicting 
these results). 
 125. Selecting the first 200 concordance hits in this particular database was 
nonrepresentative in the sense that this database generally was ordered by date, meaning that 
most of the uses I studied occurred within only a very short time span of the corpus data. See 
supra note 120 (date column described in in the Confederacy spreadsheet). Nonetheless, the 
sampling shows at least a taste of the interpretive information available from a search of naturally 
occurring corpus documents, in contrast to the wider swath of information that may be available 
through a dictionary mini corpus. (This particular research on 200 concordance lines from the 
COFEA files does not appear in my detailed Stanford study on eighteenth-century officers. The 
corpus linguistics-style analysis in that article focused mainly on the specialized founding era 
materials previously referenced by this Article.) See generally Mascott, supra note 2, Part II. 
 126. See, e.g., To George Washington from Antoine-Jean-Louis Le Bègue de Presle Duportail, 
30 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/99-01-02-11871 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) [hereinafter To Washington from 
Duportail] (file labeled “227395-body.txt”) (referring numerous times to “Artillery Officer(s)” 
without any immediate contextual information indicating the rank or authority level of 
the  officers). 
 127. Virginia Delegates to Benjamin Harrison, 8 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-07-02-0169 (last modified Nov. 26, 
2017) (file labeled “227252-body.txt”) (referring to “Brigr. Genl. McClene, the british officer 
commdg. at Detroit”). 
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captains and lieutenants128 and lieutenant colonels and majors,129 to 
ensigns, “Surgeons Mates,”130 engineers,131 and a deputy quarter 
master.132 In contrast, sergeants, corporals, and privates were indicated 
as nonofficers.133 Documents described military personnel as 
belonging to one of two categories, labeled “officers [and] men”134 or 
“[o]fficers and [s]oldiers.”135 
There were a few references to “officer” that were meaningful in 
that they helped to identify a number of distinct, fairly high-level 
officials who were characterized as officers or as holding offices. But 
none of the references provided contextual information indicating the 
particular characteristics that led these officials’ positions to be 
thought of as offices. For example, one document referred to “many 
Officers” at “the head of the Departement of the Artillery.”136 Another 
 
 128. To Washington from Duportail, supra note 126 (“Thus one of the Captains or 
Lieutenants may be detached that makes 16 Officers for the two Regiments . . . .”). 
 129. Id. (“[O]ne of the field Officers, the Lt Col. or the Major may be 
detached  also . . . .”). 
 130. From George Washington to United States Congress, 8 September 1783, FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11803 (last 
modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227250-body.txt”) (“Perhaps it is rather unimportant . . . 
whether the third Officer of a Compy shall be called a Lt or an Ensign, . . . but I highly approve 
the scheme of having supernumeraries appointed to fill the Staff-Offices, without depriving the 
Compys of their proper full proportion of Officers. The same reason which makes it proper to 
have two Sergt Majors &c. in each Regt of Infantry, will also make it equally necessary to have 
two Surgeons Mates.”). 
 131. To Washington from Duportail, supra note 126 (“So that after the Union every Officer 
Should be without any Distinction an Artillery Officer and an Engineer.”). 
 132. To George Washington from Richard Platt, 21 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11837 (last modified Nov. 
26, 2017) (file labeled “227342-body.txt”) (referring to “the undesireable office of Deputy 
Quarter Master”). 
 133. To Washington from Duportail, supra note 126 (“[E]ach Company in time of 
peace . . . [s]hall be composed of 3 Sergeants, 6 Corporals, 24 privates commanded by a first 
Captn a Second Captn one first Lt and one Second Lieutenant. . . . I propose four Officers in 
each Company . . . .”). 
 134. See, e.g., To George Washington from Charles, Marquis de La Rouërie Armand Tuffin, 
28 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents
/Washington/99-01-02-11866 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227383-body.txt”). 
 135. To George Washington from Charles, Marquis de La Rouërie Armand Tuffin 30 
September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/99-01-02-11870 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227394-body.txt”). 
 136. To Washington from Duportail, supra note 126; see also id. (“The Academy must be 
commanded (under the Director General) by a field Officer . . . .”); id. (referring to “the 
Director General” and then explaining that “[t]hrough him shall the Orders of Congress or of 
the Board of War be transmitted to the Corps. Such an Office appears to me absolutely 
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letter described officials on the “Executive Council to the Assembly of 
Pennsylvania” as “executive officers.”137 Writers used the term “office” 
in reference to the position of Governor of the Province of Quebec,138 
the position of Treasurer,139 and the position of President of the 
Continental Congress.140 Dr. Benjamin Franklin described himself as 
having spent fifty years of his life “in public offices and Trusts,”141 and 
during his time serving as a diplomat overseas, John Adams described 
himself as holding an “Office.”142 
 
necessary”). There also was a category of “Staff Officers,” From David Cobb to Timothy 
Pickering, 17 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE,https://founders.archives.gov/documents
/Washington/99-01-02-11825 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227317-body.txt”), 
and state “Militia officers” were discussed, From Alexander Hamilton to John Dickinson, [25–30 
September 1783], FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton
/01-03-02-0288 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) [hereinafter From Hamilton to Dickinson] (file 
labeled “227391-body.txt”). 
 137. From Hamilton to Dickinson, supra note 136. This letter also referred generally to 
“officers” on a committee of the Continental Congress but did not provide any additional 
information about the specific positions these “officers” held. See id. 
 138. See To James Madison from Edmund Pendleton, 29 September 1783, FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-17-02-0339 (last modified 
Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227389-body.txt”) (“Sr. Guy Carltons Enquiry into the forgery 
had probably a double view of screening the Offenders, & of exposing his predecessors 
in  Office . . . .”). 
 139. V. Jefferson’s Draft Resolution Authorizing Erection of Public Buildings for Use of 
Congress, [1783?], FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/ 
01-06-02-0287-0006 (last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227207-body.txt”) (“[T]he 
Treasurer is hereby authorized and required to make on warrants from the Auditors according 
to the established forms of his office.”). 
 140. To George Washington from Elias Boudinot, 17 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11822 (last modified Nov. 
26, 2017) (file labeled “227314-body.txt”) (letter drafted by Elias Boudinot referring to his 
“Office” during the time period that he served as president of the Continental Congress); see 
also LIBR. OF CONGRESS, 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 377 
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922), https://ia601405.us.archive.org/4/items/journalsofcontin24unit
/journalsofcontin24unit.pdf (reporting on June 2, 1783, that the “Seal of the United States of 
America” had been affixed to Elias Boudinot, the President of the United States in Con-
gress  assembled). 
 141. To John Adams from Benjamin Franklin, 10 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-15-02-0134 (last modified Nov. 26, 
2017) (file labeled “227272-body.txt”). 
 142. From John Adams to Robert Morris, 14 September 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-15-02-0141 (last modified Nov. 26, 
2017) (file labeled “227302-body.txt”) (written when John Adams served as U.S. Minister to 
the Netherlands). Writers also used the term “office” in contexts other than descriptions of 
government or military positions. For example, the word “office” was used to describe the 
relationship between nations. David Hartley to the American Peace Commissioners, 4 September 
1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-15-02-0115 
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These uses of the terms office(s) and officer(s) in the corpus files 
from the 1780s provide some enlightening information about the 
understanding of those terms during the time period leading up the 
Constitution’s ratification. But they arguably do not provide nearly as 
detailed an understanding of the broad range of the concept of officer 
evident from Nathan Bailey’s eighteenth-century dictionary. 
B. Dictionaries as a Corpus in Statutory Interpretation:  
The Term Harbor 
Examining a dictionary as a type of corpus also may provide 
relevant information to a court engaged in statutory interpretation. 
One of the advantages of searching throughout Bailey’s dictionary as 
a corpus was that it enabled a manageable, but still somewhat 
comprehensive, study of uses of the terms officer(s) and office(s). 
Those terms appeared around 500 times in the dictionary143—in 
contrast to the more than 5,000 office(s) and officer(s) references in 
the seven-year span of COFEA documents, which many scholars 
might choose just to sample.144 
Sampling is an informative tactic.145 But there is also a positive 
breadth of information available from looking at every single use of a 
term to define words throughout the entire range of the English 
language as recorded in a dictionary. Such an examination of a recently 
contested statutory term, “to harbor[],” gave insight relevant to the 
issue before the federal circuit court hearing the case. 
The question before Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit in 
United States v. Costello was whether a woman had “harbor[ed]” her 
boyfriend by permitting him to live in her home after he entered the 
country illegally and then committed a drug offense while living in 
 
(last modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227220-body.txt”) (describing how a treaty would 
lead to “the future Intercourse of all good offices between us”). And one sense of the term 
“office” denoted a task or role. See, e.g., Abigail Adams to John Adams, 20 September 1783,  
FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-05-02-0140 (last 
modified Nov. 26, 2017) (file labeled “227331-body.txt”) (“No man was happier in the sons 
his daughters had given him, two of whom attended him in his last moments, administering to 
him, those kind offices, which his afflicted daughters could not perform.” (emphasis added)). 
 143. See Mascott, supra note 2, Section II.B.2. 
 144. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Strang, supra note 14, at 1206. 
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her home.146 In other words, was it harboring just to provide one’s 
boyfriend with a “place to stay,” or does harboring require a more 
intentional action like “providing . . . a known illegal alien a secure 
haven, a refuge, a place to stay in which the authorities are unlikely to 
be seeking him”?147 Judge Posner relied in part on a Google search 
suggesting that the term harboring co-occurs frequently with terms 
that connote “deliberately safeguarding” someone from the 
authorities.148 He rejected the government’s alternative interpretation 
that harboring includes any provision of a place to stay, which was 
based in part on dictionary definitions indicating that to harbor 
includes acts as minor as housing a person.149 
In a recent essay, Justice Lee and linguistics scholars praised Judge 
Posner for moving in the right direction by expanding his interpretive 
research beyond dictionary definitions.150 They point out, however, 
that Judge Posner’s search may have been somewhat arbitrary because 
he did not explain how he chose which terms to pair with the present 
participle harboring.151 Also, Justice Lee and his co-authors pointed 
out that Judge Posner omitted any research results on the frequency 
of usage of the precise phrase that would have been of most relevance 
to the statute—“harboring aliens.”152 
Both Judge Posner and the scholars are correct that the Google 
corpus research in Costello provided helpful information beyond the 
mere entry in a dictionary defining the word harbor. But expanding 
dictionary use by examining it as a specialized corpus also could have 
provided context and depth beyond the entry defining harbor itself. 
 
 146. See United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1041, 1049–50 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), which punishes “anyone who ‘knowing or in 
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States 
in violation of law, conceals, harbors or shields from detection [or attempts to do any of these 
things], such alien in any place, including any building or any means of transportation’” (quoting 
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012) (alteration in original))). 
 147. See Costello, 666 F.3d at 1050. 
 148. See id. at 1044 (discussing the frequency of phrases such as “harboring fugitives,” 
“harboring enemies,” and “harboring refugees”). 
 149. See id. at 1043. 
 150. Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 29. 
 151. See id. at 29, 29 n.36. 
 152. See id. at 28–29, 29 n.36 (describing how Judge Posner performed a Google search 
for “harboring fugitives” and “harboring guests,” among other phrases—but not for “harboring 
alien[s]”—the term referenced in the statute). 
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One significant contribution of Judge Posner’s corpus work was 
showing that the term harboring frequently arises in phrases that imply 
intentional concealment such as “harboring fugitives” and “harboring 
Jews.”153 Examining one dictionary’s use of the term harbor in the 
context of definitions for other terms similarly reveals this possible 
connotation. But the dictionary’s contextual use of harbor actually 
more frequently associates the term with the concepts of residence and 
provision of a place to stay.154 
For instance, Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary155 uses 
harbor in defining to cherish in part as “to entertain or harbor in the 
mind deeply and resolutely.”156 A connotation of concealment is 
absent from this definition. Harbor also appeared in a definition for 
carrier: “one that harbors and disseminates the causative agent of 
disease infectious to its kind to which it is immune.”157 The use of 
harbor here also has more to do with residence than concealment, 
similar to the other definitions for carrier like “a container for 
carrying,” a “conveyer,” or a “bearer, messenger.”158 Finally, harbor is 
used in a way that does not connote concealment when Webster’s 
defines “to hold” as to “harbor” or entertain a theory.159 
In contrast, perhaps sounding more like Judge Posner’s 
conclusion that harboring necessarily involves “deliberate 
safeguarding” from discovery, Webster’s defines the term haven both 
as a (i) “harbor, port” and as (ii) “a place of safety: asylum.”160 This 
reference to harbor cuts both ways. On one hand, listing harbor as a 
kind of synonym for haven along with the word port suggests the idea 
of just a residence or a general safekeeping. On the other hand, the 
 
 153. See Costello, 666 F.3d at 1044. 
 154. Use of “Ctrl-F” identified more than seventy references to “harbor” and its variants 
in the dictionary, but many of these uses occurred in back matter such as a pronunciation guide. 
See WEBSTER’S, supra note 53. A spreadsheet detailing the references to “harbor” within the 
dictionary definitions themselves is available at the Google drive referenced in supra note 53. 
 155. See WEBSTER’S, supra note 53. 
 156. Id. at 143. The dictionary defined the verb to harbor itself as “to give shelter or refuge 
to”; “to keep possession of (an animal)”; “to be the home or habitat of: contain”; “to hold a 
thought or feeling of”; “to take shelter in or as if in a harbor” as well as some other meanings 
that it listed as relating only to animals. Id. at 379. 
 157. Id. at 128. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. at 396. 
 160. Id. at 381. 
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association of harbor with terms like haven and asylum suggests the 
more freighted concept of protection from harm or discovery. 
Finally, some of the dictionary’s references to harbor were not 
immediately determinative one way or the other. For example, the 
noun form of the term is defined in part as “a place of security and 
comfort: refuge.”161 The term harbor’s association with “refuge” 
perhaps implies protection from discovery; alternatively, the idea of 
“security and comfort” is consistent with merely providing someone 
a place to live. Similarly, the verb form of to harbor is defined both as 
the more open-ended, “to be the home or habitat of: contain” as well 
as the somewhat more freighted “to give shelter or refuge to.”162 The 
related noun “[h]arborage” is defined as “shelter” or “harbor.”163 
Judge Posner suggested the verb “‘[t]o shelter’ has an aura of 
protectiveness.”164 He thus concluded that the term harbor’s 
association with the concept of shelter suggests that harboring involves 
something more serious than housing one’s boyfriend.165 A quick 
check of just the first ten of 137 references to shelter in Webster’s 
Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary166 echoes Judge Posner’s point but 
also brings more depth to the analysis. Each of the first ten references 
to shelter indeed associates the term with a sense of protection. For 
example, an “accessory” is defined as “one who knowing that a crime 
has been committed aids or shelters the offender with intent to defeat 
justice.”167 But sometimes the protection invoked by the word shelter 
is just protection from outdoor elements like rain and sun—the type 
of sheltering that occurs when one gives a friend a temporary place to 
live.168 This connotation of shelter arises in definitions for the term 
airport (noting it usually “has facilities for the shelter, supply, and 
 
 161. Id. at 379. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 165. See id. 
 166. This is based just on the use of “Ctrl-F” to search the electronic file of the dictionary 
for references to shelter A spreadsheet containing these first ten uses of shelter and its variants is 
available on the Google drive cited in supra note 53. 
 167. WEBSTER’S, supra note 53, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 168. Cf. supra note 147 and accompanying text (identifying the legal question in Costello 
as whether giving one’s boyfriend a place to stay amounts to “harbor[ing]”). 
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repair of planes”)169 as well as the term bivouac (“an encampment 
under little or no shelter usu. for a short time”).170 
Here again, examining the dictionary as a corpus with numerous 
contextual references to shelter illuminates a more comprehensive 
range of the ordinary meanings associated with the term. The 
interpreter then can return to the context of the relevant statutory 
provision to determine whether the provision’s ban on harboring 
more likely imports the synonym of shelter (i) in the freighted sense of 
concealment, or (ii) the general sense of providing residence, 
or (iii) both. 
As scholars have noted, using corpora to identify all of the 
permissible meanings of a term still leaves unaddressed how the 
interpreter should select from those meanings to identify a term’s 
“ordinary meaning.”171 Should a term’s “ordinary meaning” be 
measured by which meaning of the word most frequently arises in the 
relevant corpora?172 Or does the ordinary meaning of a statutory term 
encompass all of the permissible meanings that fit within the relevant 
statutory context? 
Perhaps the proper question for the Seventh Circuit panel to have 
addressed about the meaning of to harbor was not whether English 
language speakers more frequently associate harboring with 
concealment versus provision of a place to stay. Maybe instead the 
court should have asked, what are all of the ordinary meanings of to 
harbor that fit properly within the statutory context? Perhaps to harbor 
encompasses both provision of a residence and deliberate 
concealment—and both acts therefore are criminal under the statute. 
Perhaps enterprise includes both organizations that have an “economic 
 
 169. WEBSTER’S, supra note 53, at 20 (emphasis added). 
 170. Id. at 87 (emphasis added). 
 171. See, e.g., Maggs, supra note 33, at 376 (noting there is still the question of selecting 
between multiple dictionary definitions and recommending that interpreters “should consider 
all of the possible meanings listed in a dictionary and state expressly the reasons that they are 
choosing one meaning over others”). 
 172. Cf. Mouritsen, supra note 2, at 190, 201 (relying on the Oxford English Dictionary’s 
“linguistic definition of ordinary” as language or usage “that [is] most commonly found or 
attested” as guidance for basing his evaluation of the “ordinary meaning” of the term enterprise 
on the context in which the word “is most frequently used”). 
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motivation” and those that do not.173 Perhaps the ordinary meaning 
of the term to carry174 includes both transporting a gun in a car and 
the more common act of carrying a gun on one’s person. Perhaps the 
statutory phrase “discharg[ing] [a] firearm” encompasses both a 
single shot and multiple shots,175 meaning the government could 
charge someone who fires a burst of shots with just a single offense 
rather than with multiple counts of discharging a weapon. In other 
words, ordinary meaning might not mean picking the most common 
use of a term but rather, identifying the full range of actions 
encompassed by the permissible meanings of that term. 
CONCLUSION 
As linguists, legal scholars, and courts seek to perfect the most 
appropriate way to incorporate corpus linguistics research techniques 
into statutory and constitutional interpretation,176 they should 
consider using dictionary corpora as an interpretive starting point. 
Legal interpreters certainly should not use dictionaries as their only 
information source. But expanding the use of dictionaries to include 
their examination as specialized mini corpora alleviates many of the 
traditional concerns with reliance on dictionaries in constitutional and 
statutory interpretation. Furthermore, examination of dictionaries as 
corpora provides one manageable means to canvas language to 
identify a wide range of permissible uses of a contested term. As 
COFEA is developed, founding era dictionaries perhaps should be 
included alongside the corpus’s natural language documents. And 
before turning to a typical corpus linguistics database, interpreters 
might better orient their empirical research by using a dictionary 
corpus to identify the range of permissible language conventions. 
 
 173. See supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis of the RICO 
statute included in Mouritsen, supra note 2). 
 174. See Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1916 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), which analyzed the meaning of “carry” in 
this  context). 
 175. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Lee’s opinion in State v. 
Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, 356 P.3d 1258 (2015), which utilized corpus linguistics analysis to 
assess the ordinary meaning of “discharge”). 
 176. Cf. Phillips et al., supra note 1, at 30 (noting that scholars have not yet fully 
“operationalized original public meaning” and, in particular, it is not yet explicitly clear whether 
finding “original public meaning” is equivalent to “finding the most frequent usage between 
competing senses of the word or phrase in question”). 
